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Abstract—The COVID-19 pandemic was a remarkable
unprecedented event which altered the lives of billions of
citizens globally resulting in what became commonly re-
ferred to as the new-normal in terms of societal norms and
the way we live and work. Aside from the extraordinary
impact on society and business as a whole, the pandemic
generated a set of unique cyber-crime related circumstances
which also affected society and business. The increased
anxiety caused by the pandemic heightened the likelihood
of cyber-attacks succeeding corresponding with an increase
in the number and range of cyber-attacks.
This paper analyses the COVID-19 pandemic from a
cyber-crime perspective and highlights the range of cyber-
attacks experienced globally during the pandemic. Cyber-
attacks are analysed and considered within the context of
key global events to reveal the modus-operandi of cyber-
attack campaigns. The analysis shows how following what
appeared to be large gaps between the initial outbreak
of the pandemic in China and the first COVID-19 related
cyber-attack, attacks steadily became much more prevalent
to the point that on some days, 3 or 4 unique cyber-attacks
were being reported. The analysis proceeds to utilise the
UK as a case study to demonstrate how cyber-criminals
leveraged key events and governmental announcements to
carefully craft and design cyber-crime campaigns.
Coronavirus; COVID-19; cyber security; cyber-attack;
cyber-crime; attack timeline; home working;
I. INTRODUCTION
The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) which started
in 2019 quickly became a global crisis event, resulting
in the mass quarantine of 100s of millions of citizens
across numerous countries around the world. At the
time of writing, the World Health Organisation (WHO)
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard reported
over 7.5 million confirmed cases and in excess of
430,241 deaths[1] globally. As COVID-19 spread across
the globe, it also led to a secondary significant threat to a
technology-driven society; i.e., a series of indiscriminate,
and also a set of targeted, cyber-attacks and cyber-crime
campaigns. Since the outbreak, there have been reports
of scams impersonating public authorities (e.g., WHO)
and organisations (e.g., supermarkets, airlines)[2, 3], tar-
geting support platforms[4, 5], conducting Personal Pro-
tection Equipment (PPE) fraud[6] and offering COVID-
19 cures[7, 8]. These scams target members of the
public generally, as well as the millions of individuals
working from home. Working at home en-masse has
realised a level of cyber security concerns and challenges
never faced before by industry and citizenry. cyber-
criminals have used this opportunity to expand upon their
attacks, using traditional trickery (e.g., [9]) which also
prays on the heightened stress, anxiety and worry facing
individuals. In addition, the experiences of working at
home revealed the general level of unpreparedness by
software vendors, particularly as far as the security of
their products was concerned.
Cyber-attacks have also targeted critical infrastructure
such as healthcare services[10]. In response to this, on
April 8th 2020, the United Kingdom’s National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC) and the United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published a joint
advisory on how cyber-criminal and advanced persistent
threat (APT) groups were exploiting the current COVID-
19 pandemic[11]. This advisory discussed issues such as
phishing, malware and communications platform (e.g.,
Zoom, Microsoft Teams) compromise. What is arguably
lacking here and in research, however, is a broader
assessment of the wide range of attacks related to the
pandemic. The current state of the art is extremely
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2dispersed, with attacks being reported from governments,
the media, security organisations and incident teams. It
is therefore extremely challenging for organisations to
develop appropriate protection and response measures
given the dynamic environment.
In this paper we aim to support ongoing research
by proposing a novel timeline of attacks related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. This timeline and the subsequent
analysis can assist in understanding those attacks and
how they are crafted, and as a result, to better prepare
to confront them if ever seen again. Our timeline maps
key cyber-attacks across the world against the spread of
the virus, and also measures such as when lockdowns
were put in place. The timeline reveals a pattern which
highlights cyber-attacks and campaigns which typically
follow events such as announcements of policy. This
allows us to track how quickly cyber-attacks and crimes
were witnessed as compared to when the first pandemic
cases were reported in the area; or, indeed, if attacks
preempted any of these events. We expand the timeline
to focus on how specific attacks unfolded, how they were
crafted and their impact on the UK. To complement these
analyses, we reflect more broadly on the range of attacks
reported, how they have impacted the workforce and
how the workforce may still be at risk. In many ways
this timeline analysis also forms a key contribution of
our work both in terms of the chronological sequencing
of attacks and the representation of campaigns using
an accepted attack taxonomy. This therefore provides a
platform which aligns with current literature and also
provides the foundation which other research can easily
build on.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II reflects
on relevant cyber-attack and cyber-crime literature, and
considers how opportunistic attacks have emerged in the
past due to real-life crises/incidents. We then present our
COVID-19-related cyber-attack timeline in Section III
as well as a dedicated focus on the United Kingdom
as a case study of key-cyber-criminal activity. This is
followed by a broader reflection on the attacks (those
within and outside of the timeline). In Section IV we
discuss the impact of attacks on those working from
home and wider technology risk. Section V concludes
the paper and outlines directions for future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
With the broad adoption of digital technologies many
facets of society have moved online, from shopping and
social interactions to business, industry, and unfortu-
nately, also crime. The latest reports establish that cyber-
crime is growing in frequency and severity[12], with
a prediction to reach $6 trillion by 2021 (up from $3
trillion in 2015)[13] and even take on traditional crime in
number and cost[14, 15]. Due to its lucrative nature[16]
and low risk level (as cyber-criminals can launch attacks
from anywhere across the globe), it is clear that cyber-
crime is here to stay.
cyber-crime, as traditional crime, is often described by
the crime triangle[17], which specifies that for a cyber-
crime to occur, three factors have to exist: a victim, a
motive and an opportunity. The victim is the target of
the attack, the motive is the aspect driving the criminal
to commit the attack, and the opportunity is a chance
for the crime to be committed (e.g., it can be an innate
vulnerability in the system or an unprotected device).
Other models in criminology, such as Routine Activity
Theory (RAT)[18] and the fraud triangle[19] use similar
factors to describe crimes, with some replacing the
victim by the means of the attacker, which it can be
considered otherwise as part of the opportunity.
While attacks today have become more sophisticated
and targeted to specific victims depending on attacker’s
motivation, for example for financial gain, espionage,
coercion or revenge; opportunistic untargeted attacks are
also very prevalent. We define “opportunistic attacks” as
attacks that select the victims based on their susceptibil-
ity to be attacked[20]. Opportunistic attackers pick-up
victims that have specific vulnerabilities or use hooks,
usually in the form of social engineering, to create those
vulnerabilities. Thus, we define as hook any mechanism
used to mislead a victim into falling prey of an attack.
These hooks take advantage of distraction, time con-
straints, panic and other human factors to make them
work[21, 9]. When victims are distracted by what grabs
their interest/attention or when they are panicked, they
are more susceptible to be deceived. Similarly, time
constraints put victims under more pressure which can
lead to mistakes and an increased likelihood to fall victim
to scams and attacks. Other examples include work
pressure, personal change of situation, medical issues, or
events that cause deep and traumatic impact in the whole
society in general such as fatalities and catastrophes.
Opportunistic attackers always seek to maximise their
gain, and therefore, will wait for the best time to launch
an attack where conditions fit those mentioned above. A
natural disaster, ongoing crisis or significant public event
are perfect cases of these conditions[22]. In the past,
several opportunistic attacks have been observed that
took advantage of specific incidents; below, we provide
few examples:
• Natural disasters: In 2005 Hurricane Katrina caused
massive destruction in the city of New Orleans
and surrounding areas in the USA[23]. Not long
after, thousands of fraudulent websites appeared
appealing for humanitarian donations, and local
citizens received scam emails soliciting personal
information to receive possible payouts or govern-
ment relief efforts. Similar scams and attacks have
3been witnessed in countless natural disasters since,
such as the earthquakes in Japan and Ecuador in
2016[24], Hurricane Harvey in 2017[25], or the
bush fires in Australia in 2020[26].
• Notable incidents or events: On 25th June 2009,
the tragic death of Michael Jackson dominated
news around the world. Only 8 hours after his
demise, spam emails claiming knowing the de-
tails of the incident were circulating online[27].
Waves of illegitimate emails echoing the fatality
appeared soon after, containing links promising
access to unpublished videos and pictures or Jack-
son’s merchandise, that in reality were linked to
malicious websites, or emails with malware in-
fected attachments[28]. Noteworthy public events
also attract a range of cyber-crime activities. During
the FIFA World Cup in 2018 for instance, there
were various attempts to lure individuals with free
tickets and giveaways[29]. These were, in fact,
scams leading to fraud.
• Security incidents: In 2012, 164 million of email ad-
dresses and passwords were exposed in a LinkedIn
data breach[30]. This data was not disclosed until
4 years later, 2016, when it appeared for sale
in the dark market. Soon after that, opportunistic
attackers began to launch a series of attacks. Many
users experienced scams, such as blackmail and
phishing, and some compromised accounts that had
not changed their passwords since the breach, were
used to send phishing links via private message and
InMail[31].
Considering the variety of scams and cyber-attacks
occurring around the events above, it is unsurprising
that similar attacks have emerged during the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. The outbreak has caused mass
disruption worldwide, with people having to adapt their
daily routines to a new reality: working from home,
lack of social interactions and physical activity, and
fear of not being prepared[32, 33]. These situations can
overwhelm many, and cause stress and anxiety that can
increase the chances to be victim of an attack. Also,
the sudden change of working contexts, has meant that
companies have had to improvise new working struc-
tures, potentially leaving corporate assets less protected
than before for the sake of interoperability.
Since the COVID-19 started, the numbers of scams
and malware attacks have significantly risen[34], with
phishing being reported to have increased by 600% in
March 2020[35]. During April 2020, Google reportedly
blocked 18 million malware and phishing emails related
to the virus daily[36]. To increase likelihood of success,
these attacks target sale of goods in high demand (e.g.,
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and coronavirus
testing kits and drugs), potentially highly profitable in-
vestments in stocks related to COVID-19, and imperson-
ations of representatives of public authorities like WHO
and aid scams[6, 37].
Brute force attacks on the Microsoft Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP) systems have increased as well[38],
signaling attacks also on technology, not only on human
aspects. It is clear then that attackers are trying the make
the most of the disruption caused by pandemic, partic-
ularly given it continues to persist. As a consequence,
several guidelines and recommendations have also been
published to protect against attacks[39, 40, 41]. These
guidelines are imperative for mitigating the increasing
threat, but to strengthen their basis, there first needs
to be a core understanding of the cyber-attacks being
launched. This paper seeks to address this gap in research
and practice by defining a timeline of cyber-attacks
and consideration of how they impact citizens and the
workforce.
III. TIMELINE OF COVID-19 RELATED
CYBER-ATTACKS
The cyber-crime incidents erupting from the COVID-
19 pandemic pose serious threats to the safety and
global economy of the world-wide population, hence
understanding their mechanisms, as well as the propa-
gation and reach of these threats is essential. Numer-
ous solutions have been proposed in the literature to
analyse how such events unfold ranging from formal
definitions to systemic approaches reviewing the nature
of threats[42, 43, 44]. While these approaches enable
the categorisation of the attack, they often lack the
ability to map larger, distributed events such as the ones
presented in this manuscript, where numerous events
stem from the pandemic are, however, unrelated. To this
end, we opted for temporal visualisation, enabling us
to map events without compromising the narrative[45].
Furthermore, this type of visualisation is used across
the cyber-security domain to represent consequent cyber-
attacks[46, 47, 48].
A. Approach to timeline creation
In this section, we outline the methodology used
to create the timeline. We explain the search terms
used to gather relevant COVID-19 cyber-attack data, the
data sources (search engines) utilised, the sources of
information we chose to focus on, and types of attack.
We also acknowledge the potential limitations of the
work.
1) Nomenclature: We explore a range of cyber-
attacks which have occurred during the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The novel coronavirus has been referred to by
several different terms in the English-speaking world, in-
cluding Coronavirus, Covid19, COVID-19, 2019-nCoV,
4and SARS-CoV-2. We use the term COVID-19 to refer
to the virus, which falls in line with terminology used
by the World Health Organization [49].
2) Construction of the timeline: To aid in the con-
struction of the timeline, we initially conducted a number
of searches to identify cyber-attacks associated with
the pandemic. These cyber-attacks were categorised by
attack type, delivery method, and were ordered by date.
The information gathered has been collated and is pre-
sented in Figure 2 which serves as a baseline for the
construction of Table I.
Information presented in the timeline includes the date
China alerted the WHO about the virus, the date the pan-
demic was officially declared, and cyber-attacks which
specifically relate to hospitals or medicine. Additionally,
key countries involved in the pandemic were identified,
and for those, we present the first identified case, the date
lockdown was implemented, and the first cyber-attack
they suffered. The table seeks to examine a sub-set of
the information from the timeline.
Furthermore, we have chosen to include a number
of sources offering reports of attacks. The sources are
a mixture of reputable news outlets (such as Reuters,
and the BBC), blog articles, security company reports,
and social media posts. Though blog articles and social
media posts are not considered to be an academic source,
in the context of this research where we are examining
an emerging threat, they offer important insights into
trends of cyber-attacks. It is also important to note that
cyber-attacks may first be presented in these domains,
before being highlighted by mainstream media outlets.
With regards to the inclusion of news reports in the
table of attacks and subsequent timeline, it should be
acknowledged that these attacks are being presented
through a journalistic lens, and as such may be written
in an attempt to grab headlines. Nevertheless, these
reported cyber-attacks still pose a tangible threat to the
general public during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
timeline seeks to provide an overview of attacks which
have occurred.
The state-of-the-art review of reports was performed
from mid-March to mid-May 2020. The timeline limits
cyber-attacks to those experienced by 31st March. This is
because we reached what we believed to be a saturation
point comprising a sufficient number of cyber-attacks to
be representative. Following the conclusion of the search,
the earliest reported attack was on 6th January 2020 [51],
whilst the most recently listed attack in the timeline was
31st March 2020 [52]. The most recently listed attack in
the table was 13th May 2020 [53]. The table progresses
the time period a bit further as it intends to provide more
detail in regards to cyber-attacks experienced during this
time. Sources were gathered from a number of locations.
The criteria used to locate reports have been defined
below and are presented in a similar way to existing
reviews in cyber security literature[54, 55]. The structure
of the timeline is described in further detail in Section
III-B.
Search engines: Several search engines were used
in the creation of the table and timeline. These were-
Google1 (US-based and dominates the search engine
market share), Baidu2 (Chinese-based search provider),
Qwant3 (French-based search engine with a focus on
privacy), and DuckDuckGo4 (US-based search engine
with a focus on privacy).
Keywords used: A variety of keywords were used
when collating reports of cyber-attacks. Non-English
terms were translated using the Google Translate service
[56] and additional independent sources were used as a
means of validating the translation. When focussing on
the virus itself, the following key words were used: sars-
cov-2, Covid, Covid19, Coronavirus, 冠状病毒(Chinese
translation for Coronavirus, confirmed by the World
Health Organization[57]), コロナウイルス(Japanese
translation for Coronavirus, confirmed by the Japanese
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare[58]).
When searching for cyber-attacks, the following key
phrases were used: 网络攻击(Chinese translation means
Network Attack[59] or Cyber Attack[60]), サイバ
攻 (Japanese translation for Cyber Attack or Hacking
Attack [61]), Attaque Informatique (French translation
for Computer Attack [62]), Attacco Informatico (Italian
translation for Cyber Attack [63]).
Time range: We attempted to find the earliest reported
cyber-attack which was associated with the COVID-19
pandemic. To allow for development of the timeline, and
analysis of findings, mid-May 2020 was defined as a cut-
off point, with the most recent news article being dated
13th May 2020[5].
Exclusion criteria: Although we have created a com-
prehensive table and timeline, a number of results were
excluded from the research. These included results which
a) were behind a paywall, b) required account creation
before full article was displayed, c) were duplicates of
existing news reports, and d) could not be translated.
3) Types of cyber-attacks : To guide our analysis and
the creation of a timeline of COVID-19-related cyber-
attacks, we decided to define attacks based on their
types. This allowed us to examine the prominence in
certain types of attacks. Although there exist numerous
taxonomies relating to attacks and cyber-crimes (e.g.,
[64, 9, 65, 66]), there exists no universally accepted
model[67]. In this work therefore, we relied on the
UK’s Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) categorisation of
1www.google.com
2www.baidu.com
3www.qwant.com
4www.duckduckgo.com
5Fig. 1. Cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes[50]
cyber-crime. This definition includes cyber security by
default and has inspired many international definitions
of cyber-crime.
The CPS guidelines categorise cyber-crime into two
broad categories: cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled
crimes[50]. A cyber-dependent crime is an offence, “that
can only be committed using a computer, computer
networks or other form of information communications
technology (ICT)”[68]. Cyber-enabled crimes are, “tra-
ditional crimes, which can be increased in their scale
or reach by use of computers, computer networks or
other forms of information communications technology
(ICT)”[69]. These categories as well as examples of
their subcategories can be seen in Figure 1. Some of
the elements described by CPS are often interlinked in
a cyber-attack. For instance, a phishing email or text
message (e.g., SMS or WhatsApp) might be used to lure
a victim to a fraudulent website. The website then may
gather personal data which is used to commit financial
fraud, or it may install malware (more specifically,
ransomware) which is then used to commit extortion.
This notion of cyber-attack sequences is explained in
further detail in Section III-B.
Similarly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are in-
creasingly used by cyber-criminals to distract (or,
act as ‘smokescreens’ for) businesses during hacking
attempts[70, 71]. In what follows, we consider the types
of these attacks and reflect on how they have been
launched, including any human factors or technical as-
pects (e.g., vulnerabilities) they attempt to exploit.
Phishing, or Social Engineering more broadly, in-
cludes attempts by illegitimate parties to convince indi-
viduals to perform an action (e.g., share information or
visit a website) under the pretence that they are engaging
with a legitimate party. Quite often email messages
are used, occasionally SMS or WhatsApp messages are
used (referred to as smishing). Pharming is similar to
phishing but instead of deceiving users into visiting
malicious sites, attackers rely on compromising systems
(e.g., the user’s device or DNS servers) to redirect
individuals to illegitimate sites. This type of attack is
less common in general, as it requires more access or
technical capabilities. Financial fraud generally involves
deceiving individuals or organisations using technology
for some financial gain to the attacker or criminal.
Extortion refers to actions that force, threaten or coerce
individuals to perform some actions, most commonly,
releasing finances.
Hacking, Malware and Denial of Service (DoS) at-
tacks are forms of crime that are often favoured by more
technical attackers. Hacking involves compromising the
confidentiality or integrity of a system, and requires
a reasonable about of skill; its techniques can involve
exploiting system vulnerabilities to break into systems.
Malware refers to malicious software and can be used for
disrupting services, extracting data and a range of other
attacks. Ransomware is one of the most common type
of malware today[72, 73], and combines malware with
extortion attempts. DoS attacks target system availability
and work by flooding key services with illegitimate
requests. The goal here is to consume the bandwidth
used for legitimate server requests, and eventually force
the server offline.
These types of attack provide the foundation for
our analysis in the timeline and how we approach our
discussion in later part of this research.
4) Limitations of the table: Within Table I, two
columns referring to dates are provided. The first column
“Article Date” refers to the date the reference was
initially published. We acknowledge that in some cases,
the web pages linked to the references continued to be
updated with information following its inclusion with
the paper. The table has been ordered by “Article Date”
to provide a consistent chronological representation of
events.
We have also provided a second column,“Attack
Date”. When examining each reference, if a specific date
was provided as to when the attack was executed, it was
included. The rational behind including the attack date
and report date is that an attack may not surface until
several days after it has been carried out.
5) Limitations of the timeline: Two types of cyber-
attack reports are considered within this manuscript,
those which describe cyber-attacks without providing
6the date of the attack and those which describe cyber-
attacks and include the date of the perpetration. When
the date of the attack is not included, the date provided
in the timeline refers to the date of the publication. The
rationale behind the inclusion of both types of reports
is based on providing a chronological representation
of events. Furthermore, while the table provides an
extensive overview of the threat landscape, it is by no
means an exhaustive list of all the attacks carried out in
relation to the pandemic, as gathering such information
would not be possible in this context due to the lack and
quality of reporting, the number of targeted incidents,
the number of incidents targeted at the general public,
the global coverage of the pandemic and the number of
malicious actors carrying out these attacks.
However, despite these limitations we have explored
all resources available to depict the threat landscape as
accurately as possible.
B. The timeline
In this section, we examine the cyber-attacks in
further detail. Figure 2 provides a detailed temporal
representation of the chain of key cyber-attacks in-
duced by the COVID-19 pandemic. The timeline in-
cludes the first reported cases in China, Japan, Ger-
many, Singapore, Spain, UK, France, Italy, and Portu-
gal and then the subsequent lockdown announcements.
The timeline presents 43 cyber-attacks categorised using
the CPS taxonomy described in Section III-A3 and
abbreviated as: P:phishing (or smishing), M:malware.
Ph:pharming, E:extortion, H:hacking, D:denial of ser-
vice and F:financial fraud. The events related to the crisis
were validated against WHO timeline of events to ensure
an accurate temporal reproduction.
Table I describes a number of cyber-attacks in fur-
ther detail. Within the table, cyber-attacks have been
organised by attack date. If the attack date was not
available within the reference, then the article date has
been used. The target-country of each cyber-attack has
been listed, alongside a brief description of the methods
involved. Finally, the attack type has also been classified
in accordance with the CPS taxonomy described earlier
where it has been mentioned within the reference.
Both the figure and the table present specific cyber-
attacks and incidents and exclude: general advisories
(e.g. from governmental departments), general discus-
sions and summaries of attacks, and detailed expla-
nations of techniques and approaches utilised by the
attackers.
C. COVID-19 cyber-attacks in the United Kingdom
The extent of the cyber-security related problems
faced in the UK was quite exceptional, and in this section
we use the UK as a case study to analyse COVID-19
related cyber-crime. The discussion herein demonstrates
that as expected and outlined above, there was a loose
correlation between policy/news announcements and as-
sociated cyber-crime campaigns. The analysis presented
herein focuses only on cyber-crime events specific to
the UK. So for example, although many of the incidents
identified in the previous section and particularly in
[102] are global cyber-attacks, the discussion herein
ignores these. Consequently, numerous announcements
purportedly coming from reputed organisations such as
WHO and a plethora of malware which reached UK
citizens is ignored as these were not UK specific issues.
Indications of the extent of the UK cyber-crime in-
cident problem experienced during the pandemic are
provided by the reported level of suspect emails and
fraud reported. By early May (07-05-20), more than
160,000 ‘suspect’ emails had been reported to the Na-
tional Cyber Security Centre [103] and by the end of
May (29-05-20), £4.6m had been lost to COVID-19
related scams with around 11,206 victims of phishing
and / or smishing campaigns [104]. In response, the
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) took down 471
fake online shops [105] and HMRC (Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs) took down 292 fake websites
[106].
The timeline in Figure 3 shows a series of UK specific
events and cyber-crime incidents. The timeline indicates
a direct and inverse correlation between announcements
and incidents.
Direct correlations are instances where perpetrators
appear to follow announcements or events, they may
have drawn on these events and carefully configured
cyber-attacks around policy context. These are shown
in the figure with a solid coloured connecting arrow.
Inverse correlations are instances where an incident
has no clear correlation with an event or announce-
ment. Although inverse correlations do not appear to
have a direct correlation, these may exist because a
number of events were being actively highlighted in the
media. For example, the issue of personal protective
equipment (PPE) was in active discussion well before
the UK government gave this priority consideration.
Similarly, the likelihood of a tax rebate scheme was in
active consideration in early March before the budget
announcement on 11-03-20. The first tax rebate phishing
campaigns were in active circulation before the budget
announcement. In both cases, we should emphasise that
these are loose correlations and more work needs to be
done in terms of whether a predictive model can be built
using this data and data around the world as examples.
On 11th March 2020, the UK government made a
number of important budgetary announcements [107]
which included: a £5bn emergency response fund to
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DESCRIPTIONS OF COVID-19 RELATED CYBER-ATTACKS
ID Ref. Country Attack
Type
Description Article
Date
Attack
Date
1 [51] China P.M Vietnam accused of launching a METALJACK phishing campaign against the Wuhan
district offices
22/04 06/01
2 [74] Global P.M International reports that both phishing and smishing campaigns are taking place 19/01 -
3 [75] China,
Mongolia
P.M Chinese hackers accused of distributing the Vicious Panda malware to Mongolia through
emails purporting to come from the Mongolian ministry of affairs
12/03 20/01
4 [76] Phillipines P.M.F REMCOS malware distributed to Phillipino citizens 13/03 23/01
5 [77] Singapore P Phishing campaign steals email log-in credentials 28/01 -
6 [78] Japan P.M.F Safety measures phishing campaign distributes Emotet malware 28/01 28/01
7 [79] China P.M.F ’Safety measure’ email from a ’Singaporian specialist’ distributes Emotet malware 06/02 29/01
8 [77] USA P Email purporting list of COVID-19 cases in victim’s city takes user to website which
steals credentials
11/02 31/01
9 [80] China H DoS on epidemic prevention units 09/02 02/02
10 [80] China P Phishing campaign steals email log-in credentials 09/02 02/02
11 [81] World P.M.F First cases of AZORult a data theft malware 10/02 -
12 [82] China P.M Email purporting specialist safety measures from WHO prompts malware download 12/02 -
13 [76] Vietnam P.M LOKIBOT malware spread through email purporting incorrect invoice payment 13/03 03/02
14 [83] China P.Ph Phishing attack on medical groups in China (from India) 06/02 06/02
15 [84] China P.M.E Distribution of CXK-NMSL ransomware through COVID-19 themed emails 18/02 09/02
16 [84] China P.M.E Distribution of Dharma/Crysis ransomware through COVID-19 themed emails 18/02 13/02
17 [76] Italy P.M Trickbot malware distributed through email 13/03 02/03
18 [85] Global P.M.F MBR wiper malware disguised as contact tracing information 04/03 -
19 [76] USA P.M FORMBOOK malware distributed through email purporting parcel shipment advice 13/03 08/03
20 [86] USA M Health systems in Champaign Urbana Public Health District (Illinois) affected by the
netwalker ransomware
12/03 10/03
21 [76] Spain P.M Email purports COVID-19 remedy as mooted by Israeli scientists days in advance 13/03 10/03
22 [87] Czech H Cyber-attack on Czech hospital 14/03 14/03
23 [88] USA H Denial of Service on U.S. Health Agency 16/03 -
24 [89] Libya P.M Corona live 1.1 is the SpyMax malware which in this case is a trojanised app which
exfiltrates user data
18/03 -
25 [90] World P.M Corona mask offer installs what appears to be a harmless malware which distributes an
SMS to all contacts. Presumably an update to the app will mobilise the malware
19/03 -
26 [91] Global P.E Extortion campaign threatens to infect the recipient with COVID-19 unless a $4,000 bitcoin
payment is made
17/04 20/03
27 [92] Spain P.M Netwalker ransomware attack disguised as an email advising on restroom use 24/03 -
28 [93] USA P.M SMS asks recipient to take a mandatory COVID-19 ‘preparation’ test, points to website
which downloads malware
24/03 24/03
29 [94] UK P.M SMS informs recipient to stay at home with a link for more information. Link directs
recipient to a malware ridden website
24/03 -
30 [95] UK P.Ph.F Free school meal SMS directs recipient to website which steals payment credentials 25/03 24-03
31 [96] World M.F Ginp Trojan distributed in an Android app. App charges e0.75 for information on infected
persons in the recipients region. In actual fact, it steals the payment information
25/03 -
32 [52] Global P Skype credentials stolen through a crafted phishing campaign 23/04 31/03
33 [97] World P.Ph.M.F Free Netflix offer directs users to a malware ridden website 27/03 -
34 [98] UK M Fake NHS website gathers user credentials 28/04 -
35 [99] UK P.M Email purports to offer job retention payment as per the UK governmental announcement 30/04 19/04
36 [100] Global M Coronalocker locks a computer and appears to cause rather more annoyance than any real
damage
21/04 -
37 [101] Global P.M Docusign recipients directed to fake website offering COVID-19 information 08/05 -
38 [5] UK P.M Recipients are directed to a fake track and trace website which collects user credentials 13/05 -
key: P:Phishing (or smishing); Ph:Pharming; E:Extortion; M:Malware; F:Financial fraud; H:Hacking
support the NHS and other public services in England; an
entitlement to statutory sick pay for individuals advised
to self-isolate; a contributory Employment Support Al-
lowance for self-employed workers; a £500m hardship
fund for councils to help the most vulnerable in their
areas; a COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme
for small firms; and the abolishment of business rates
for certain companies.
Soon after, the government continued to make an-
nouncements to support the citizenry and economy.
These announcements included: a scheme to support
children entitled to receive free school meals (19-03-
20); a hardship fund (24-03-20); help for supermarkets
to target vulnerable people (25-03-20); the potential
availability of home test kits (25-03-20); a job retention
scheme (17-04-20); and the launch of the much awaited
track and trace app (04-05-20).
Events such as these increase the likelihood of a
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TABLE II
SELECTED CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EVENTS AND CYBER-CRIMINAL CAMPAIGNS
Event date Event Incident date &
type
Incident
21-02-20,
09-03-20
Doctors warn GPs are running out of PPE;
Hospitals running out of PPE
17-04-20 p,ph,f
27-05-20 p,ph,f
Fake PPE offers through email. Link to URLs
which capture credit card and other details
11-03-20 Government announces a range of financial
assistance packages in the budget
20-03-20 p,ph,f Smishing campaign promising a COVID-19
financial relief payment. Respondents are di-
rected to a fake gov.uk website which requests
credit/debit card details
19-03-20 Government announces a scheme which entitles
children who qualify for a free school meal to
a food voucher or alternatives if they are not
able to continue attending school.
24-03-20 p,ph,f A smishing campaign which targeted parents
with a promise of help with their free school
meals in return for banking details. Banking
details are defrauded
23-03-20 Lockdown announced. £60 contravention fine,
later (10-05-20) increased to £100
27-03-20 p,e Lockdown contravention SMS
24-03-20 COVID-19 hardship fund enables councils to
reduce council tax bills by £150 for residents
of working age and who have had their bill
reduced by an award of council tax reduction
15-05-20 p,ph,f Council tax rebate scam
25-03-20 Government announce intention to make home
testing kits available
31-03-20 p,f,
17-04-20 p,f,
27-05-20 p,f
Phishing campaigns in England and Scotland
direct victims to fake websites which claim to
sell PPE equipment
17-04-20 Government announces job retention scheme 19-04-20 p,f Fake job retention scheme phishing campaign.
positive response to a cyber-criminal campaign and per-
petrators are very likely to hook onto events. Although
there appears to be a link between some of the events
and incidents, a number of scams cannot easily be traced
to a single event or announcement. Examples of this
include a goodwill payment of £250 (21-03-20), an
NHS financial donation request (02-04-20), vouchers for
UK supermarkets (02-04-20, 15-04-20, 28-04-20), and a
charitable donation to the recipient. None of these events
have associated governmental announcements or even
general public speculation.
Examples supporting our notion of a correlation be-
tween events and cyber-security campaigns are provided
in Table II and illustrated in Figure 3. These examples
indicate a loose correlation between events and cyber-
criminal campaigns. Many of the cases outlined in Table
II and Figure 3, were very simple. Potential victims were
provided URLs through email, SMS, or Whatsapp. An
example of this is provided in Figure 4. In this case,
the URL pointed to a fake institutional website which
requests credit/debit card details. Although there are
elements of this process which are obviously suspicious
to a more experienced computer user, for example,
spelling errors (relieve instead of relief in the COVID-19
relief scam), suspect reply email addresses and clearly
incorrect URLs, these are not immediately obvious to
many users.
D. Analysis of cyber-attacks and associated risks
The timeline shown in Figure 2 and the UK case
study above creates an ideal platform through which
to analyse the cyber-attacks that have occurred in light
of the pandemic. From the point that the first case
was announced in China (08-12-19), the first reported
COVID-19 inspired cyber-attack took 30 days. The next
reported cyber-attack was 14 days (19-01-20). From this
point onwards, it is clear that the timeframe between
events and cyber-attacks reduces dramatically.
The 43 cyber-attacks presented in the timeline can be
further categorised as follows:
• 37 (86%) involved phishing and / or smishing
• 2 (5%) involved hacking
• 2 (5%) involved denial of service
• 28 (65%) involved malware
Fig. 4. The COVID-19-relieve scam[108]
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• 15 (34%) involved financial fraud
• 6 (13%) involved pharming
• 6 (15%) involved extortion
Whilst this analysis is useful, the sequence of events
in the complete attack can also provide key attack
insights. The timeline reveals these sequences and shows
the complete campaign comprising of, for instance, the
distribution of malware (m) through phishing (p) which
steals payment credentials which are used for financial
fraud (f ). We can describe this cyber-attack sequence as
p,m,f. Analysing cyber-attacks in this way is important
because this indicates multiple points in a cyber-attack
where protections could be applied. The timeline reveals
the following cyber-attack sequences:
• p,m: n=8, 19%
• p,m,f: n=10, 23%
• ph,m: n=1, 2%
• p,ph: n=1, 2%
• p.m.e: n=5, 12%
• p,ph,m: n=2, 5%
• p,ph,f: n=1, 2%
• p,e: n=1, 2%
• p,ph,m,f: n=1, 2%
This analysis does not include the sequence of events
that took place in the two hacking and two denial
of service incidents. It should be noted that although
financial fraud is the most likely goal in most of the
cyber-attacks described in the timeline, financial fraud
was only recorded in the timeline where reports have
clearly indicated that this was the outcome of a cyber-
attack. In reality, the p,m,f and p,ph,f cases are
likely to be higher.
Figure 5 provides a summary of the countries that
were the target of early cyber-attacks during the pan-
demic, organised by attack date. As shown, China and
the USA account for 39% of the attacks reported. It
is also clear from Table I that both of these countries
were primary target from the start of the pandemic. The
attacks then spread to the United Kingdom and more
other countries. By March 2020 however, a vast majority
of the attacks are targeted at the whole world, with a
reminder of attacks specifically focused at events in a
single country, such as tax rebates due to COVID-19, or
contact tracing phishing messages.
It is useful to consider this in the context of UK
specific cyber-attacks. This examination reveals that
phishing was a component of all (n=17) the cyber-
attacks analysed. 1 involved extortion as the final goal,
the remaining 16 involved financial fraud. 9 cyber-
attacks comprised the sequence: p,ph,f, 7 comprised
the sequence p,f, the remaining 1 comprised of p,e.
It is notable that although an NHS malware dis-
tribution website was discovered and removed on 23-
04, none of the cyber-attacks we analysed appeared to
involve malware in the same way that the global analysis
reveals. There may be a number of reasons for this.
Launching a malware connected campaign requires more
sophistication and time. There may be less opportunity to
directly connect it to a specific event or announcement.
The time delay between some of the announcements
and the associated campaigns was remarkably short.
For instance, the time delay between the lockdown an-
nouncement (23-03-20) and the ‘lockdown contravention
fine’ (25-03-20) was 2 days, and the time delay between
the job retention scheme announcement (17-04-20) and
the job retention scam (19-04-20) was also 2 days.
To reflect more generally on the cyber-attacks dis-
covered, we can see that phishing (including smishing)
were, by far, the most common based on our analysis.
In total, it was involved in 86% of the global attacks.
This is however, unsurprising, as phishing attempts are
low in cost and have reasonable success rates. In the
case of COVID-19, these included attempts at imper-
sonating government organisations, the WHO, the UK’s
National Health Service (NHS), airlines, supermarkets
and communication technology providers. The specific
context of the attacks can be slightly different however
the underlying techniques, and the end goal is identical.
For instance, in one email impersonating the WHO,
attackers attach a zip file which they claim contains an e-
book that provides, “the complete research/origin of the
corona-virus and the recommended guide to follow to
protect yourselves and others”[109][2]. Moreover, they
state: “You are now receiving this email because your
life count as everyone lives count”. Here, attackers are
using the branding of WHO, posing as helpful (the
Fig. 5. Cyber-attack distribution across countries examined
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remainder of the email contains legitimate guidance),
and appealing to people’s emotions in crafting their
attack email[110, 9]. Similar techniques can be seen in a
fake NHS website created by criminals detected online,
which possesses identical branding but is riddled with
malware[111], and a malicious website containing mal-
ware which also presents the legitimate Johns Hopkins
University COVID-19 dashboard[4]. It is notable that the
fake WHO email contains spelling/grammatical errors.
The discussion in Section III-C provides further specific
examples of this.
To further increase the likely success of phishing
attacks cyber-criminals have been identified register-
ing large numbers of website domains containing the
words ‘covid’ and ‘coronavirus’[112]. Such domains
are likely to be believable, and therefore accessed,
especially if paired with reputable wording such as
WHO or Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) or key words (e.g., Corona-virusapps.com,
anticovid19-pharmacy.com, which have been highlighted
as in use[113]). Communications platforms, such as
Zoom, Microsoft and Google, have also been imper-
sonated, both through emails and domain names[112].
This is noteworthy given the fact that these are the
primary technologies used by millions across the world
to communicate, both for work and pleasure. These
facts, in combination with convincing social engineering
emails, text messages and links, provide several notable
avenues for criminals to attack. Pharming attacks were
much less common but did occur in 13% of cases. As
can be seen Table I, these often occur alongside other
attacks.
COVID-19-inspired fraud has leveraged governmen-
tal/scientific announcements to exploit the anxieties of
users and seek financial benefit. From our analysis, fraud
was typically committed through phishing and email
attacks—we also can see this in our sequencing above. In
one case, criminals posed as the CDC in an email and
politely requested donations to develop a vaccine, and
also that any payments be made in Bitcoin[105]. Typical
phishing techniques were used, but on this occasion these
included requests for money: “Funding of the above
project is quite a huge cost and we plead for your good
will donation, nothing is too small”. A notable point
about this particular attack is that it also ask recipients to
share the message with as many people as possible. This
is concerning given that people are more likely to trust
emails they believe have been vetted by close ones[9].
There were a range of other fraud attempts, largely
based on threats or appeals. For instance, our analysis
identified offers of investment in companies claiming
to prevent, detect or cure COVID-19, and investment
in schemes/trading options which enable users to take
advantage of a possible COVID-19 driven economic
downturn [114]. There were offers of cures, vaccines,
and advice on effective treatments for the virus. The
Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) issued 16 warn-
ing letters between 6th March and 1st April 2020 to
companies “for selling fraudulent products with claims
to prevent, treat, mitigate, diagnose or cure” COVID-
19[115, 116]. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
has responded to the flood of fake products online by
opening an enquiry concerning imports of fake products
due to COVID-19 pandemic[117], and in the UK, the
Medical and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA) has began investigating bogus or unlicensed
medical devices currently being traded through unautho-
rised and unregulated websites[118].
Extortion attacks were witnessed in our analysis but
were less prevalent (appearing in only 13% of cases)
compared to the others above. The most prominent
case of this attack was an extortion email threatening
to infect the recipient and their family members with
COVID-19 unless a Bitcoin payment is made[119]. To
increase the believability of the message, it included
the name of the individual and one of their passwords
(likely gathered from a previous password breach). After
demanding money, the message goes on to state: “If
I do not get the payment, I will infect every member
of your family with coronavirus”. This attempts to use
fear to motivate individuals to pay, and uses passwords
(i.e., items that are personal) to build confidence in the
criminal’s message.
Malware related to COVID-19 increased in promi-
nence during the pandemic and impacted individuals
and organisations across the world. As shown above,
it was the second largest cyber-attack type, appearing
in 65% of cases. Vicious panda and MBR Loader
were the only new malware discovered in this pe-
riod. The remaining malware attacks were variants
of existing malware and included Metaljack, REM-
COS, Emotet, LOKIBOT, CXK-NMSL, Dharma-Crysis,
Netwalker, Mespinoza/Pysa, SpyMax (disguised as the
Corona live 1.1 app) GuLoader, Hawkeye, FORMBOOK,
Trickbot and Ginp. Ransomware, in particular, was a
notable threat and an example of such was COVIDLock,
an Android app disguised as a heat map which acted as
ransomware; essentially locking the user’s screen unless
a ransom was paid[120].
At the organisational level, ransomware has signifi-
cantly impacted healthcare services—arguably the most
fragile component of a country’s critical national in-
frastructure at this time. Attacks have been reported
in the United States, France, Spain and the Czech
Republic[121, 10], and using ransomware such as Net-
walker. Such attacks fit a criminal modus operandi if
we assume that malicious actors will target areas where
they believe they stand to capitalise on their attacks; i.e.,
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health organisations may be more likely to pay ransoms
to avoid loss of patient lives. Interestingly there have
since been promises from leading cyber-crime gangs that
they will not (or stop) targeting healthcare services. In
one report, operators behind CLOP Ransomware, Dop-
pelPaymer Ransomware, Maze Ransomware and Nefilim
Ransomware stressed that they did not (normally) target
hospitals, or that they would pause all activity against
healthcare services until the virus stabilises[122].
Other notable malware examples during the pandemic
include: Trickbot, a trojan that is typically used as a
platform to install other malware on victims’ devices—
according to Microsoft, Trickbot is the most prolific
malware operation that makes use of COVID-19 themed
lures for its attacks[123]; a Master Boot Record (MBR)
rewriter malware that wipes a device’s disks and over-
writes the MBR to make them no longer usable[124];
and Corona Live 1.1, an app that leveraged a legitimate
COVID-19 tracker released by John Hopkins University
and accessed device photos, videos, location data and
the camera[53]. As the pandemic continues, there are
likely to be more strains of malware, targeting various
types of harm, e.g., physical, financial, psychological,
reputational (for businesses) and societal[125].
During the COVID-19 pandemic our analysis only
identified a very small amount (5%) of DoS attacks,
but there were several reports of hacking. These reports
suggested that hacking was not indiscriminate but in-
stead, targeted towards institutions involved in research
on coronavirus.
In one report, FBI Deputy Assistant Director stated,
“We certainly have seen reconnaissance activity, and
some intrusions, into some of those institutions, espe-
cially those that have publicly identified themselves as
working on COVID-related research”[126]. This was
further supported by a joint security advisory a month
later from the UK’s NCSC and USA’s CISA[127]. In this
advisory, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups—
some of which may align with nation states—were
identified as targeting pharmaceutical companies, med-
ical research organisations, and universities involved in
COVID-19 response. The goal was not necessarily to
disrupt their activities (as with the ransomware case),
but instead to steal sensitive research data or intellectual
property (e.g., on vaccines, treatments).
While a detailed analysis of these attacks has not
yet surfaced, password spraying (a brute-force attack
which applying commonly-used passwords in attempting
to login to accounts) and exploiting vulnerabilities in
Virtual Private Network (VPN) have been flagged[127].
Attribution is another important consideration during
such attacks. Determining the true origin of cyber-attacks
has always been difficult, however, in response to these
COVID-19-related threats, the US openly named the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a perpetrator in
a joint FBI/CISA announcement[128].
IV. IMPACT ON WORKFORCE
The effects of the pandemic, the mass quarantine of
staff and the measures put in place to facilitate remote
working and resilience of existing cyber-infrastructures,
against the attacks and timelines previously described,
had a profound effect on the workforce – the people
engaged in or available for work. The pandemic also had
an effect on the resilience of technology, socio-economic
structures and threatened, to a certain degree, the way
people live and communicate. Figure 6 illustrates the
COVID-19 impact on the workforce across eight differ-
ent categories. All categories seemingly integrate with
cyber-enabled assets and tools and different categories
may be impacted differently. The pandemic created risk
conflicts, for example, strict compliance with security
standards which discourage data sharing, could be more
harmful than sharing the data. So, whilst there may be
strict requirements for patient data not to be accessed at
home by GPs (general practitioners), this causes a greater
harm during quarantine than enabling GPs to access pa-
tient data. Also, the way confidential patient information
is processed requires a data protection impact assessment
(DPIA) to enable further NHS support where needed.
This can have an impact in terms of the timely delivery
of medical interventions in response to COVID-19.
In traditional risk classification, elements like asset
registration and valuation, threat frequency and vulnera-
bility probability are at greater risk of cyber threat. We,
therefore, anticipate changes on the way the workforce
accesses those information assets and how strategic,
tactical and operational tasks are executed to generate
socio-economical outputs. These changes can be cap-
tured by the development and testing of risk statements
capturing 1) threat agents, 2) vulnerabilities, 3) Pol-
icy/process violation and 4) overall asset exposure on
all emerging threat landscapes as illustrated in Figure 6.
These changes unavoidably cascade further changes to
the threat landscapes associated with remote workforce
activities and the increasing frequency of weaponised
attack vectors related to the coronavirus spreading. Given
the current climate, it is difficult to predict whether these
changes will have a long-lasting effect on the work-
force, but their significance is already recorded [129].
Therefore, it is increasingly important that the control
of information (storage, processing, transmission) has an
elevated importance given the increase of cyber-attacks
on important infrastructures.
Governments, private and public sectors throughout
Europe currently consider measures to contain and
mitigate COVID-19 impact on existing data structures
and information governance frameworks (for example,
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[130]). Particular emphasis is placed upon the impli-
cations of the pandemic in the processing of personal
data. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
legislation in the UK dictates that personal data must
be processed only for the specific and explicit purposes
for which it has been obtained [131]. In addition, data
subjects should always receive explicit and transparent
information with regard to the processing activities un-
dertaken, including that of features and nature of the
activity, retention period and purpose of processing.
There are challenges related to the governance legal
and regulatory compliance landscape in terms of con-
formance versus rapid access and processing of data by
different entities. This is quite apparent in cases where
public authorities seek to obtain PII to reduce the spread
of COVID-19. Typical examples also include contact
tracing applications and platforms in which the data
is aggregated online for post-processing [132]. Specific
legislative measures have to be re-deployed or introduced
to safeguard public security while maintaining privacy at
scale, while legal and regulatory principles continue to
upheld [133].
With the rapid increase of COVID-19 symptoms,
governments had to derive a plan that would enable them
to understand epidemiological data further and identify
positive interventions to contain and mitigate the impact
of the pandemic. Research shows a high correlation be-
tween the use of big data that includes private identifiable
information in the effectiveness of these epidemiological
investigations [134]. That meant that in most cases, citi-
zens had to provide this information voluntarily and that
quickly resulted in discussions and debates on the trade-
offs between public safety versus personal privacy [135].
The information has also been obtained through internet
communication technology. Medical testing equipment
and coronavirus testing at a large-scale were used as
instruments for data collection in the fight to reduce
mortality rates. The legal and regulatory compliance
frameworks differ between countries; thus, managing
personal information was subject to different privacy
protection measures.
The de-identification of personal information was an-
other component that governments had to exercise to
satisfy personal privacy requirements and increase the
trust of human participants during the epidemiological
investigations. The process of collecting and process-
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ing personal information by applying de-identification
technologies raised technical challenges with regards
to accuracy and consent, safe and legally defensive
data disposal and robustness of associated policies of
data processing and management for epidemiological
research. The urgency of the situation and the speed at
which the data had to be acquired and processed, created
a sense of distrust amongst citizens and challenged
the efficacy of the existing processes in place [135].
The extensive lockdown periods introduced in many
countries (described in Section III) have also tested their
ability to deploy strategies for business recovery after
these periods. These strategies had to ensure smooth and
phased out recovery within an ongoing pandemic, which
has proved to be a challenging task. However, there is
an unprecedented speed and scale on the R&D activities
in response to the COVID-19 outbreak forcing cross-
organizational multilateral collaborations [136, 137].
There is currently a challenge across Europe to or-
chestrate information sharing in a timely and accurate
manner as even mainstream media sources seem to
have propagated false information [138]. The increase
on both frequency and impact of these attacks will test
further our existing monitoring and auditing capabilities,
logical and physical access controls, authentication and
verification schemes currently deployed. Also, as part
of the current enterprise risk management approaches
the way organisations sanitise incident reporting, media
disposal and data destruction and sharing processes will
also be tested alongside to traditional defence-in-depth
principles currently established as de-facto. The finance
sector is also affected as the predicted financial recession
will leverage the sophistication and scale of targeted
attacks as threat actors grow their capabilities [139].
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated remarkable
and unique societal and economic circumstances lever-
aged by cyber-criminals. Our analysis of events such
as announcements and media stories has shown what
appears to be a loose correlation between the announce-
ment and a corresponding cyber-attack campaign which
utilises the event as a hook thereby increasing the
likelihood of success.
The COVID-19 pandemic, and the increased rate of
cyber-attacks it has invoked have wider implications,
which stretch beyond the targets of such attacks. Changes
to working practises and socialization, mean people
are now spending increased periods of time online.
In addition to this, rates of unemployment have also
increased, meaning more people are sitting at home
online- it is likely that some of these people will turn to
cyber-crime to support themselves. The combination of
increased levels of cyber-attacks and cyber-crime means
there may be implications for policing around the World-
law enforcement must ensure it has the capacity to deal
with cyber-crime [140].
The analysis presented in this paper has highlighted a
common modus-operandi of many cyber-attacks during
this period. Many cyber-attacks begin with a phishing
campaign which directs victims to download a file or
access a URL. The file or the URL act as the carrier
of malware which, when installed, acts as the vehicle
for financial fraud. The analysis has also shown that to
increase the likelihood of success, the phishing campaign
leverages media and governmental announcements.
Although this analysis is not necessarily novel, we
believe this is the first time that this has been supported
with a context of actual live events. This analysis gives
rise to the recommendation that governments, the media
and other institutions should be aware that announce-
ments and the publication of stories are likely to give
rise to the perpetration of associated cyber-attack cam-
paigns which leverage these events. The events should
be accompanied by a note / disclaimer outlining how in-
formation relating to the announcement will be relayed.
Our research presents opportunity for further research.
This research has shown what can best be described as a
loose direct and inverse correlation between events and
cyber-attacks. Further research should investigate this
phenomenon and outline whether a predictive model can
be used to confirm this relationship. There is an abundant
supply of cyber-attack case studies relating to countries
around the world and a wider analysis of the problem
can help in affirming this phenomenon.
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